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Abstract 
This paper proposes tests for instrument validity in sample selection models with non-
randomly censored outcomes. Such models commonly invoke an exclusion restriction (i.e., 
the availability of an instrument affecting selection, but not the outcome) and additive 
separability of the errors in the selection process. These assumptions allow us to both point 
identify and bound the outcome distribution of the subpopulation of the always selected, 
whose outcomes are observed irrespective of the instrument value. As the point must lie 
within its bounds, this yields two testable inequality constraints. We apply our tests to two 
instruments conventionally exploited for the estimation of female wage equations: non-
wife/husband's income and the number of (young) children. Considering eight empirical 
applications, our results suggest that the former is not a valid instrument, while the validity 
of the latter is not refuted on statistical grounds. 
Keywords 
Sample selection, instrument, test. 
JEL Classification 
C12, C15, C24, C26. 1 Introduction
The sample selection problem as discussed in Gronau (1974) and Heckman (1974) arises when
the outcome of interest is only observed for a non-randomly selected subpopulation. This is an
ubiquitous phenomenon in empirical economics. E.g., when estimating the returns to schooling
or training it is an issue when only a selective subgroup is employed, which is a condition for
observing earnings. As a second example, several studies in development and educational eco-
nomics assess the impact of school vouchers or other incentives on test scores in high school and
college, see for instance Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer (2006) and Angrist, Lang, and Oreopou-
los (2009). In this context, sample selection bias is an issue because only a selective subgroup of
students usually takes the test.
In the presence of sample selection, Heckman (1974, 1976, and 1979) proposed fully parametric
maximum likelihood and two step estimators, assuming that the errors in the selection and
outcome equations are jointly normally distributed. These assumptions are theoretically sucient
for identication by exploiting the (known) nonlinearity of the selection bias correction term, the
so-called inverse Mill's ratio. In practice however, this is often tenuous due to multicollinearity
problems. Many empirical applications therefore rely on instrumental variables (IV) which are
presumably related to selection, but have no direct eect on the outcome of interest. Such
IV exclusion restrictions are even more crucial when considering generalizations of the original
sample selection model. E.g., Cosslett (1991), Gallant and Nychka (1987), Powell (1987), and
Newey (2009) relax the distributional assumptions but maintain the single index structure in the
selection equation and linearity in the outcome equation. In contrast, Ahn and Powell (1993)
allow for a nonparametric selection equation, whereas Das, Newey, and Vella (2003) identify a
fully nonparametric model with additively separable errors. Finally, Newey (2007) considers a
general model with non-separable errors in the outcome equation, which comes at the cost that
interesting parameters such as partial eects are only identied in the selected subpopulation.
It is worth noting that all of the mentioned sample selection models, even the most general
1ones, invoke additive separability of the unobserved term in the selection equation for reasons
of identiability. As shown by Vytlacil (2002), this is equivalent to assuming that the potential
selection state of each individual increases or decreases (weakly) monotonically in the value of the
instrument.1 Standard sample selection models, no matter whether parametric, semi-parametric,
or non-parametric, therefore rely on two crucial restrictions: Firstly, the satisfaction of the ex-
clusion restriction and secondly, the monotonicity of selection in the instrument (or equivalently,
the additive separability of the errors in the selection equation). However, the validity of theses
assumptions in applied work has not been assessed on statistical grounds.
Therefore, the rst contribution of this paper is the proposition of a novel test for the joint
satisfaction of the exclusion restriction and monotonicity. It is closely related to the test suggested
in Huber and Mellace (2011), who, however, consider the conceptually dierent framework of
treatment endogeneity. Assuming a binary instrument for the ease of exposition, the test is based
on the following intuition. Under IV validity, the outcome distribution of the always selected,
who are selected irrespective of the instrument, is point identied. It simply corresponds to the
distribution in the selected subpopulation not receiving the instrument. On the other hand, the
selected subpopulation receiving the instrument consists of both always selected and compliers,
whose selection state reacts on the instrument. In this mixed population, upper and lower bounds
on the distribution of the always selected can be derived by using the results of Horowitz and
Manski (1995). Clearly, the identied outcome distribution of the always selected in the absence
of the instrument must lie within the bounds in the presence of the instrument, otherwise the
IV assumptions are violated. This provides us with two inequality constraints, which we verify
by using the minimum p-value test with partial recentering proposed by Bennett (2009). While
the test is not asymptotically uniformly powerful in the sense that the null may still be violated
even if the point identied parameter is within its bounds, a rejection unambiguously points to a
violation of IV validity.
It is worth noting that further IV validity tests have been proposed in the context of sample
1Such monotonicity restrictions have been prominently discussed in Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist,
Imbens, and Rubin (1996), albeit in the dierent context of treatment endogeneity.
2selection models. Blundell, Gosling, Ichimura, and Meghir (2007) and Kitagawa (2009) suggest
methods to verify the IV exclusion restriction when additive separability of the unobserved term
in the selection equation is not assumed. Their framework is therefore more general than the
one considered in this paper which is, however, predominant in the empirical literature primarily
concerned with the identication of marginal eects. The test of Blundell, Gosling, Ichimura,
and Meghir (2007) is based on (i) bounding the outcome distribution of the total population
conditional on the instrument and (ii) verifying whether bounds crossing occurs across dierent
values of the instrument.2 They do not show asymptotic validity of their inferential bootstrap
procedure.
Kitagawa (2009) proves that the bounds considered in Blundell, Gosling, Ichimura, and Meghir
(2007) are not necessarily sharp. He provides a test relying on sharp bounds which is based on the
intuition that under the exclusion restriction, the integral over the envelope of the conditional
densities of the observed outcomes given the instrument must not be larger than one. As a
second contribution, Kitagawa (2009) also derives a testable implication (without providing a
formal test) under additive separability. Not surprisingly, the latter increases asymptotic testing
power compared to assuming the exclusion restriction alone. We will show that one of our
constraints is equivalent to the implication of Kitagawa (2009). However, based on the same the
model assumptions, we also provide a second testable constraint not considered therein. Finally,
Cr epon (2006) proposes a test for the exclusion restriction at innity. I.e., testing relies on
observations that are selected with probability one, which may not be available in a particular
empirical application. In contrast, neither our approach nor the one of Kitagawa (2009) requires
that some outcomes are observed with certainty.
Our second contribution is an empirical one. We investigate the IV validity of two variables
prominently used in female wage regressions to control for sample selection, where selection bias
comes from the labor supply decision. The rst instrument is non-wife income (such as husband's
income or other sources of family income). Most empirical studies nd that non-wife income
2It has already been noticed by Manski (2003) that the exclusion restriction is violated if the identication
region dened by the bounds is empty.
3aects female labor supply negatively, see for instance Mroz (1987) and Zabel (1993). However,
the instrument is only valid if it neither exhibits direct eects on the female wage, nor is related
to unobserved terms aecting wage. The latter would for instance be violated if unobserved social
and economic attributes were related both with the expected wage and the likelihood to nd a
partner with a particular income level. In fact, Becker (1981) argues that individuals of superior
productivity tend to marry one another, which is in line with the empirical nding of Nakosteen,
Westerlund, and Zimmer (2004) that spouses tend to be economically similar before marriage, at
least in the dimension of earnings. We therefore test the IV validity of non-wife income in four
data sets that cover various countries and/or socio-economic groups and come from Schafgans
(1998), Martins (2001), Chang (2011), and Wooldridge's online archive (the LABSUP data set
on http://fmwww.bc.edu/ec-p/data/wooldridge/datasets.list.html).
The second instrument is the number of young children in the household. The intuition is that
women with young kids are less likely to provide labor due to time constraints related to child
rearing. Indeed, the vast majority of empirical studies examining the connection between fertility
and female labor supply nd a negative correlation. However, the validity of this instrument,
implying that the number of children is not directly related with wages, in not undisputed. There
are theoretical arguments that suggest that labor supply, wages, and fertility are endogenous,
see for instance the multiple equation family model proposed by Fleisher and Rhodes (1979).
E.g., if women with relatively low expected future wages had on average a higher fertility, the
IV exclusion restriction would fail. Therefore, we investigate the IV validity in four data sets
previously analyzed by Martins (2001), Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), Lee (2009), and Chang
(2011).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes the sample
selection model and the testable implications. For ease of exposition, a binary instrument will
be assumed in the rst place. Section 3 introduces the tests based on Bennett (2009). Section 4
generalizes the discussion to non-binary instruments. The empirical applications to the estimation
of female wage equations are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
42 The selection model and testable implications
This section outlines the sample selection model along with the testable implications. To this end,
we introduce some notation. Y is a (scalar) continuous outcome variable with bounded support,
X denotes a scalar or a vector of covariate(s), and U represents the unobserved terms aecting
the outcome. A general outcome equation can be written as
Y = '(X;U); (1)
where ' is an unknown function. E.g., when assessing the returns to schooling, Y is the wage,
X may be education and labor market experience, and U are unobserved factors such as ability
and motivation. Researchers and policy makers are typically interested in parameters like the
conditional expectation E[Y jX = x] or the marginal or average eect of X. However, in the
presence of sample selection, Y is only observed for a non-random subpopulation, e.g., the em-
ployed (while X is assumed to be observed for the entire population). To address this problem,
let S 2 f1;0g be an observed binary selection indicator which is 1 if the outcome of some indi-
vidual is observed and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, denote by W and V observed and unobserved
terms aecting selection, respectively. Then, the selection decision may be expressed as
S = If(W;V ) > 0g; (2)
where Ifg denotes the indicator function and () is an unknown function.
The sample selection problem arises when the unobserved terms V and U are not
independent. In a general model set-up (without imposing tight parametric assumptions) a rst
requirement for identication is that at least one variable in W satises an exclusion restriction
w.r.t. Y , e.g., see the discussion in Newey (2009). I.e., there exists one variable in W that does
not belong to X (which aects the outcome). In this case, we may write W = (X;Z), where Z
denotes the instruments not appearing in the outcome equation. Furthermore, the exclusion
5restriction requires that Z is independent of the unobserved term U in the outcome equation
and consequently also of the unobservable V in the selection equation, as the latter is related
with U. Therefore, a commonly invoked assumption is joint independence of (X;Z) and (U;V ),
as for instance in Newey (2007). Including X in the assumption is required if we want to give
a causal interpretation to the covariates. However, here we are just interested in testing IV
validity such the following conditional independence assumption suces:
Assumption 1:
Z is independent of (U;V )jX (conditional independence of the instrument and unobserved
terms).
In addition to the exclusion restriction, virtually all selection models, including the nonpara-
metric framework of Newey (2007), impose additive separability of the unobserved term in the
selection equation, which results in the standard single index crossing model
S = If(X;Z) + V > 0g: (3)
Additive separability is attractive because even in general models, identication of causal eects
of X typically relies on the index restriction E(UjS = 1;X;Z) = E(UjS = 1;Pr(S = 1jX;Z)),
see for instance Newey (2009), which allows using Pr(S = 1jX;Z) as a control function.3 As
discussed in Das, Newey, and Vella (2003), the index restriction is implied by assuming (3)
along with joint independence of (X;Z) and (U;V ) (at least conditional on Pr(S = 1jX;Z)) and
a strictly monotonic cdf of V . Furthermore, note that Vytlacil (2002) shows that a selection
model with additively separable unobservables can be equivalently analyzed by assuming that
the potential selection state of each individual increases or decreases weakly monotonically in the
value of the instrument.
3In contrast, Mealli and Pacini (2008) consider identication (for binary treatment variables) when conditioning
on a binary instrument directly rather than using Pr(S = 1jX;Z) as a control function. In this case, point
identication is not obtained in general, but requires additional assumptions.
6We propose a test for the joint satisfaction of (i) the exclusion restriction and (ii)
monotonicity (and thus, additive separability of the unobserved term). If both assumptions hold,
we say that Z satises IV validity. Without loss of generality and to keep the exposition simple,
we will derive our testable implications for a binary instrument Z in the rst place. The results
will be extended to multivalued instruments later on. To translate (3) into the monotonicity
assumption to be tested, we use the potential outcome notation (see for instance Rubin, 1974)
and denote by S(z) the potential selection state if the instrument Z was exogenously set to z.
Note that S = Z S(1)+(1 Z)S(0). For a binary instrument, monotonicity (given X) implies
the following:
Assumption 2:
Pr(S(1)  S(0)jX) = 1 (positive monotonicity) or
Pr(S(0)  S(1)jX) = 1 (negative monotonicity).
Henceforth, we will only consider positive monotonicity of S in Z, as a symmetric argument
follows under negative monotonicity. Furthermore, we will omit conditioning X in our discussion
for the sake of ease of notation. This is in spite of our awareness that instruments may not be
valid unconditionally, but only after controlling for the observed characteristics X. In fact, both
unconditional and conditional IV validity will be examined in the empirical section. The reader
may therefore consider the subsequent discussion to take place within cells dened upon X.
Our test exploits the fact that under IV validity, the outcome distribution of a particular
subpopulation can be both point identied and bounded and that the point must lie within
its bounds. In what follows, we will derive these testable implications. Using the principal
stratication framework of Frangakis and Rubin (2002) and a similar notation as in Angrist,
Imbens, and Rubin (1996), the population can be divided into four types according to the reaction
of the selection state on the instrument. The always selected are those with observed outcomes
irrespective of the instrument state, the compliers are selected under Z = 1, but not under Z = 0,
the deers are selected under Z = 0, but not under Z = 1, and the outcomes of the never selected
7are never observed. Table 1 displays the relationship between the types, denoted by T, and the
potential selection states.
Table 1: Types
Type (T) S(1) S(0) appellation
a 1 1 Always selected
c 1 0 Compliers
d 0 1 Deers
n 0 0 Never selected
As either S(1) or S(0) but never both are known for any individual, the type of a subject
is not directly observed. Without any assumptions we neither identify the proportions of the
various types, nor the outcome distributions within each type, which are the ingredients of our
test. To see this, note that the observed values of Z and S dene four observed subgroups, which
all are mixtures of two types. A second complication is that outcomes are only observed for those
with S = 1. Table 2 summarizes these results.
Table 2: Observed subgroups and types
observed values Z;S types Y observed
fi : Zi = 1;Si = 1g subject i belongs either to a or to c yes
fi : Zi = 1;Si = 0g subject i belongs either to d or to n no
fi : Zi = 0;Si = 1g subject i belongs either to a or to d yes
fi : Zi = 0;Si = 0g subject i belongs either to c or to n no
However, by Assumption 2, deers are ruled out. I.e., if monotonicity holds such that deers
do not exist, all observations with Z = 1;S = 0 must belong to the never selected while all
individuals with Z = 0;S = 1 are always selected. For a similar result in the context of selection
models, see the discussion in Lee (2009), who, however, considers monotonicity of selection in a
binary treatment. The non-existence of deers allows us to point identify the proportions of the
various remaining types T 2 fa;c;ng, denoted by T. To see this, let Psjz  Pr(S = sjZ = z)
the observed selection probability conditional on the instrument. By the independence of Z and
V imposed by Assumption 1, the share of any type conditional on the instrument is equal to
its unconditional proportion in the entire population. Therefore, the relationship between the
observed conditional probabilities and latent type proportions is as shown in Table 3.
8Table 3: Observed conditional probabilities and type proportions
Observed cond. selection prob. type proportions
P1j1  Pr(S = 1jZ = 1) a + c
P0j1  Pr(S = 0jZ = 1) n
P1j0  Pr(S = 1jZ = 0) a
P0j0  Pr(S = 0jZ = 0) c + n
It is easy to see that P1j1 P1j0 identies the complier's proportion. This will be important for
the identication of the outcome distributions of the always selected, which our test relies upon.
We therefore introduce some further notation. Denote by f(yjZ = z;T = t) the pdf of Y = y for
a particular type T = t given Z.4 Furthermore, let f(yjZ = z;S = s) denote the conditional pdf
of Y = y given Z and S. As outlined in Table 2, only two of possibly four conditional pdfs are
observed: f(yjZ = 1;S = 1) and f(yjZ = 0;S = 1). Equivalent to Imbens and Rubin (1997) in
the context of treatment endogeneity, it follows that the former is a mixture of the always selected
and the compliers, where the mixing proportions correspond to the relative shares of types in the
conditional outcome distribution.
f(yjZ = 1;S = 1) =
a
a + c
 f(yjZ = 1;T = a) +
c
a + c
 f(yjZ = 1;T = c): (4)
Horowitz and Manski (1995) have shown that whenever it is possible to bound or point
identify the mixing probabilities (in our case a
a+c and c
a+c, respectively), sharp bounds can
be obtained for any parameter of the mixture components that respects stochastic dominance.









allows us to bound the outcome distributions of either type in the mixed distribution by applying
the ndings of Horowitz and Manski (1995). To this end, let q correspond to the proportion of
always selected in the mixed population: q =
P1j0
P1j1. Furthermore, denote by yq the qth conditional
quantile in the conditional outcome distribution given Z = 1 and S = 1, i.e., yq = G 1
Y jZ=1;S=1(q),
where G is the cdf. From the results of Horowitz and Manski (1995) follows that the pdf of Y
4Note that the instrument Z and the type T uniquely dene the value of the selection indicator S such that
conditioning on the latter is redundant.
9among the always selected in the mixed population is bounded by
[0;1] \

f(yjZ = 1;S = 1)   (1   q)
q
;
f(yjZ = 1;S = 1)
q

for all y in the support of Y:
This rule holds for probability measures (also other than the pdf) in general. To extend
the discussion to broader denitions of probabilities, let Pr(Y 2 AjZ = z;S = 1) denote the
conditional probability that the value of Y belongs to some subset A given S = 1 and Z = z.
E.g., for some value y in the support of Y , A may be dened as ( 1;y] for obtaining the cdf.




Pr(Y 2 AjZ = 1;S = 1)   (1   q)
q
;
Pr(Y 2 AjZ = 1;S = 1)
q

for all A in the support of Y:
Concerning the mean outcome of the always selected, the results of Horowitz and Manski
(1995) imply that its bounds correspond to trimmed averages, see also the related discussion in
Lee (2009) (where, however, S is monotonic in a treatment, not in Z):
[E(Y jZ = 1;S = 1;Y  yq);E(Y jZ = 1;S = 1;Y  y1 q)]:
I.e., sharp bounds on the mean outcome of the always selected are obtained by averaging Y over
the upper and lower share of the distribution which corresponds to the proportion of the always
selected in the mixed population. Note, however, that these bounds are (in contrast to those
of the probability measures) also valid under the weaker mean independence E(U;V jZ = 1) =
E(U;V jZ = 0) rather than full independence. Therefore, if the parameter of interest is the mean
outcome E(Y ), Assumption 1 might be weakened to mean independence.
In addition to the identication of bounds, our model assumptions also point identify the
pdf of the always selected. By Assumption 2 we have that for all y and A in the support of Y ,
10respectively,
f(yjZ = 0;S = 1) = f(yjZ = 0;T = a) andPr(Y 2 AjZ = 0;S = 1) = Pr(Y 2 AjZ = 0;T = a);
as deers are ruled out. Similarly, the mean outcome among the always selected is
E(Y jZ = 0;T = a) = E(Y jZ = 0;S = 1):
Furthermore, by the exclusion restriction, Pr(Y 2 AjZ = 1;T = a) = Pr(Y 2 AjZ = 0;T = a),
otherwise the instrument Z would have a direct eect on Y . Therefore, our model assumptions
imply that the point identied Pr(Y 2 AjZ = 0;T = a) lies within the bounds of Pr(Y 2 AjZ =
1;T = a) in the mixed population. Hence, it must hold that
Pr(Y 2 AjZ = 1;S = 1)   (1   q)
q
 Pr(Y 2 AjZ = 0;S = 1) 
Pr(Y 2 AjZ = 1;S = 1)
q
for all A in the support of Y; (5)
or, when considering the mean, that
E(Y jZ = 1;S = 1;Y  yq)  E(Y jZ = 0;S = 1)  E(Y jZ = 1;S = 1;Y  y1 q): (6)
Therefore, if the testable restrictions (5) and (6) are not satised, either the exclusion restriction,
or monotonicity, or both are violated, which is the base of our tests outlined in the next section.
We conclude this section by linking our results to Kitagawa (2009), who also derives
a testable implication based on the same model assumptions. Considering only positive
monotonicity, Kitagawa (2009) shows in his Proposition 2.3 that under IV validity,
f(y;S = 1jZ = 0)  f(y;S = 1jZ = 1) for all y in the support of Y: (7)
I.e., the joint density of Y and S = 1 given Z = 1 must nest the joint density of Y and S = 1 given
11Z = 0 for any value of Y . Rearranging terms such that f(y;S = 1jZ = 1) f(y;S = 1jZ = 0)  0
gives the intuitive interpretation that the pdf of the compliers' outcome must not be smaller than
zero, as densities must not be negative.
Note that our restriction (5) is equivalent to






Pr(Y 2 A;S = 1jZ = 0)
P1j0

Pr(Y 2 A;S = 1jZ = 1)
P1j0
(8)
for all A in the support of Y , because
Pr(Y 2 AjZ = 1;S = 1)   (1   q)
q
=
Pr(Y 2 A;S = 1jZ = 1)











Pr(Y 2 AjZ = 1;S = 1)
q
=
Pr(Y 2 A;S = 1jZ = 1)
q  Pr(S = 1jZ = 1)
=
Pr(Y 2 V;D = 1jZ = 1)
P1j0
;
Pr(Y 2 AjZ = 0;S = 1) =
Pr(Y 2 A;S = 1jZ = 0)
P1j0
;
by using basic probability theory. (8) in turn implies that for all A in the support of Y ,
Pr(Y 2 A;S = 1jZ = 1)   (P1j1   P1j0)  Pr(Y 2 A;S = 1jZ = 0)  Pr(Y 2 A;S = 1jZ = 1);
(9)
and when applied to the pdf, that for all y in the support of Y
f(y;S = 1jZ = 1)   (P1j1   P1j0)  f(y;S = 1jZ = 0)  f(y;S = 1jZ = 1): (10)
I.e., our restriction (10) adds one further testable implication to (7) derived by Kitagawa (2009). If
we rearrange the rst part in (9) Pr(Y 2 A;S = 1jZ = 1) (P1j1 P1j0)  Pr(Y 2 A;S = 1jZ = 0)
12to be Pr(Y 2 A;S = 1jZ = 1) Pr(Y 2 A;S = 1jZ = 0)  (P1j1 P1j0), our additional implication
gets an intuitive interpretation: The joint probability of being a complier and having a particular
value of the outcome (and any sum of joint probabilities dened by non-overlapping subsets A)
must not be larger than the unconditional probability of being complier, because
Z
[f(y;S = 1jZ = 1)   f(y;S = 1jZ = 0)]dy = P1j1   P1j0: (11)
However, it has to be mentioned that asymptotically, (10) does not increase power compared
to testing based on (7) alone. The reason is that if under any value of the selected outcome (10)
does not hold, there must exist at least one other value under which (7) is violated, otherwise
(11) is not satised. The same argument carries over to any probability measures dened by
non-overlapping subsets A. Therefore, exploiting (10) is at best useful in nite samples, either
because its violation occurs in regions where estimation is more precise than in areas where (7) is
binding, and/or due to the use of overlapping subsets A for reasons of eciency. In the latter case
it may theoretically happen that (10) does not hold, while at the same time negative densities of
complier outcomes average out with positive ones in the subsets A considered. For an intuitive
example in a related testing problem, we refer to Huber and Mellace (2011).
3 Testing
This section outlines the test procedure based on the method proposed in Bennett (2009). First
note that expression (5) provides us with two testable inequality constraints for general proba-






q   Pr(Y 2 AjZ = 0;S = 1)






















As (12) refers to any probability measure, it can be used to construct tests with multiple inequality
constraints. E.g., it may be applied to the pdf at various points in the outcome distribution,
13which increases asymptotic testing power. Then, the number of constraints obtained is twice
the number of probability measures considered. Concerning the mean outcome of the always
selected, (6) implies the following two constraints. As already mentioned, the latter only require
that the unobserved terms are mean independent of the instrument, which is a necessary, albeit





E(Y jZ = 1;S = 1;Y  yq)   E(Y jZ = 0;S = 1)




















Under the alternative hypothesis that the instrument does not satisfy monotonicity and/or has
a direct eect on the outcome, at most one of the two constraints in (12) and (13), respectively,
might be binding. This is the case because violations of the rst and second constraint are
mutually exclusive. Furthermore, note that even if no inequality constraint is violated, IV validity
may not be satised. I.e., we detect violations only if they are large enough such that the point
identied parameter of the always selected lies outside the bounds in the mixed population.
Ideally, we would like to test for the equality of the parameters within the always selected across
instrument states. However, this is not feasible as it remains unknown which individuals in the
mixed population belongs to the group of always selected or compliers. Therefore, without further
assumptions, testing based on inequality moment constraints is the best one can get. It is obvious
that such tests gain power as the proportion of compliers decreases, implying that the bounds on
the probabilities and mean outcomes of the always selected become tighter.
To keep the discussion on testing general, we will denote by  the collection of constraints to be
tested. E.g., when considering the mean,  = (m1;m2)0, when considering probabilities,  may
include a large number of constraints depending on the various denitions of A. Furthermore, let
^  denote the estimate of  based on an i.i.d. sample containing n observations, which can easily be
shown to satisfy a standard GMM estimation problem, see Huber and Mellace (2011). As in our
companion paper, we will use the novel minimum p-value-type test proposed by Bennett (2009) for
joint inequality moment constraints. The test relies on the following, quite general assumptions
14(see Assumption 1 of Bennett, 2009) which are satised in a standard GMM framework: (i) i.i.d.
sampling, (ii) bounded second moments, (iv) Lipschitz continuity of the moment functions with
the Lipschitz function having bounded second moments, (v) linear representation of the testing
problem.
In contrast to other tests based on inequality constraints, e.g. Andrews and Jia (2008),
Andrews and Soares (2010), Hansen (2005), and Donald and Hsu (2010), the Bennett (2009)
test invariant to studentization and does not require the choice of any smoothing function as in
Chen and Szroeter (2009). Furthermore, it estimates the distribution of the minimum p-value
min(P^ ) based on two sequential bootstraps, where the second resamples from the distribution
of the rst bootstrap. Therefore, it does not rely on the double (i.e., nested) bootstrap (see
Beran, 1988) as in Godfrey (2005), which may be computationally intensive. Bennett (2009)
considers both full (i.e., standard) recentering of inequality constraints and partial recentering
of only those constraints which are either violated in the sample or not violated but within a
small neighborhood of the boundary of the null hypothesis. He shows that partial recentering
(henceforth minP.p) has weakly superior nite sample properties than full recentering (henceforth
minP.f). The algorithm of both methods can be sketched as follows:
1. Estimate the vector of parameters ^  in the original sample.
2. Draw B1 bootstrap samples of size n from the original sample.
3. In each bootstrap sample, compute the recentered vector ~ 
f
b  ^ b   ^  for the minP.f test
and the partially recentered vector ~ 
p
b  ^ b   max(^ ; n) for the minP.p test, where n is
a sequence such that n ! 0 and
p
n  n ! 1 as n ! 1.5
5In the applications further below, we choose n =
q
2ln(ln(n))
n  ^ i; i 2 f1;2g, where ^ i is the estimated (in
the B1 rst stage bootstrap samples) standard deviation of the i-th inequality constraint, as suggested by Bennett
(2009). It is, however, not guaranteed that this choice is optimal, see for instance the discussion in Donald and
Hsu (2010).
154. Estimate the vector of p-values for minP.f, denoted by P~ f:










n  ^ g: (14)
5. Compute the minimum P-values for minP.f:
^ pf = min(P~ f): (15)
6. Draw B2 values from the distributions of ~ 
f
b and ~ 
p
b. We denote by ~ 
f
b2 and ~ 
p
b2 the resampled
observations in the second bootstrap.
7. In each bootstrap sample, compute the minimum P-values of minP.f and minP.p, denoted
by ^ pf;b2 and ^ pp;b2:
^ pf;b2 = min(P~ f;b2); ^ pp;b2 = min(P~ p;b2); (16)
where










n  ~ 
f










n  ~ 
p
b2g: (17)
8. Compute the p-values of the minP.f and minP.p tests by the share of bootstrapped minimum
p-values that are smaller than the respective minimum p-value of the original sample:








If^ pp;b2  ^ pfg: (18)
As already mentioned, minP.f and minP.p only dier in terms of recentering. The former test
recenters all four constraints, while the latter recenters only the restrictions that either violate
the null or are in the null but close (i.e., within n) to equality in the original sample. Partial
recentering allows estimating the number of binding constraints from the data and therefore
16provides a better approximation of the asymptotic distribution of the test under the null. It
dominates minP.f in terms of power while yielding asymptotically exact size, see Bennett (2009).
4 Non-binary instruments
This section generalizes the testable implications to bounded non-binary instruments. We denote
by zmin and zmax the minimum and maximum in the support of the possibly continuous or
multi-valued discrete Z. This requires us to replace Assumption 2 by the following monotonicity
assumption:
Assumption 3:
Pr(S(z)  S(z0)) = 1 8 z;z0 satisfying zmin  z0 < z  zmax (positive monotonicity).
I.e., z and z0 are two distinct subsets of the support of Z such that any element in z is larger
than any element in z0.
Note that the complier share may well be small or even zero for some pairs z;z0, as mono-
tonicity implies that each individual switches its selection state at most once under the null as
a reaction to dierent values of the instrument. While small or zero complier shares point to a
weak instrument problem and appear undesirable for estimation, the converse is true for testing,
as a complier share of zero maximizes asymptotic power. A further dimension relevant to test-
ing power is the number of subsets considered. I.e., it is useful to look at all possible pairs of
neighboring6 z and z0 for which the inequality constraints must hold under instrument validity.
In large samples small subsets therefore appear preferable, rstly to minimize the complier share
and secondly to maximize the number of neighboring pairs of z and z0. However, in small samples
a trade-o between nite sample power and asymptotic power may well occur.
6Note that for any xed z, neighboring z and z
0 give weakly lower complier shares than non-neighboring pairs
and thus, entail a higher asymptotic power.





1 if Z 2 z
0 if Z 2 z0
: (19)
Under Assumptions 1 and 3, our previous results also hold when replacing Z by ~ Z (and ignoring





Pr(Y 2Aj ~ Z=1;S=1) (1 q)
q   Pr(Y 2 Aj ~ Z = 0;S = 1)
Pr(Y 2 Aj ~ Z = 0;S = 1)  










E(Y j ~ Z = 1;S = 1;Y  yq)   E(Y j ~ Z = 1 = 0;S = 1)




Let n ~ Z be the number of possible choices of ~ Z with neighboring subsets. Testing IV validity
amounts to applying the test procedures outlined in Section 3, where the number of inequality
constraints is now 2n ~ Z instead of 2. To give an example, consider the case that Z may take the
values 0, 1, or 2. The number of possible denitions of ~ Z with neighboring z;z0 is 4:
z0 = 0 z = 1;
z0 = 1 z = 2;
z0 = 0 z = f1;2g;
z0 = f0;1g z = 2:
This implies that we have 2  4 = 8 testable inequality constraints based on neighboring pairs.
Notice that also considering the non-neighboring pair z0 = 0;z = 2 does neither increase nite
nor asymptotic power: A test base on the non-neighboring pair is weakly dominated by using
z0 = f0;1g;z = 2 and z0 = 0;z = f1;2g in terms of the sample size (which inuences nite
sample power) and entails a weakly higher complier share than any other neighboring pair. As a
18nal remark, note that n ~ Z becomes innite when the instrument is continuous. In practice, the
researcher will have to dene a nite number of subsets that depends on the richness of the data
in the application considered and will, thus, again face a trade-o between asymptotic and nite
sample power.
5 Applications
In this section, we present eight applications to test the IV validity of two variables prominently
used in sample selection models concerned with the estimation of female wage equations.
The rst instrument is non-wife or husband's income, which we verify in Martins (2001),
Schafgans (1998), Chang (2011), and the instructional data set \LABSUP" of Wooldrigde
(http://fmwww.bc.edu/ec-p/data/wooldridge/datasets.list.html). The second one is the
number of (young) children in the household, which we consider in Martins (2001), Mulligan
and Rubinstein (2008), Chang (2011), and Lee (2009). In our analysis we discretize both
instruments. In three out of four cases, the rst instrument is equal to one if non-wife or
husband's income is larger than the median value in the sample and zero otherwise. The second
instrument indicates whether the number of children is larger than zero. By discretization, we
sacrice asymptotic testing power. On the other hand, this will help to ensure that the number
of observations is not too small when investigating conditional IV validity in subsamples dened
upon observables X. We test the constraints on the mean outcome of the always selected
postulated in (13), as well as on the probability measures, see (12). In the latter case, we
use four subsets A which are dened by an equidistant grid on the support of the observed
outcomes. This provides us with 8 testable inequality constraints.7
The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5. Under the null the third column provides,
depending on whether the parameter is positive or negative, the complier or deer share,
respectively, which is relevant because testing power increases as the absolute value decreases.
7Which number and denition of the subsets A is optimal for testing is an unsolved issue. We therefore also
considered more or less subsets, but the results did not dier in an important way such that they are not reported
here. However, they are available from the authors upon request.
19The fourth column reports the maximum of the standardized dierences of the constraints
on the mean in (13). I.e., the maximum of (m
1 ;m
2 ) is divided by the standard deviation of
the observed outcomes. A negative value or zero implies that no constraint is binding, while
the converse is true for positive dierences. I.e., the standardized dierence gives us an idea
of how severely a constraint is violated (however, without saying anything about precision).
Columns 5 to 8 contain the p-values with partial (p) and full (f) recentering for the mean- and
probability-based tests, respectively.
Table 4: Applications - non-wife income
mean constraints prob. constraints
Study n % comp. st.dist p-val(p) p-val(f) p-val(p) p-val(f)
Schafgans (1998)- female sample 2770 0.001 0.658 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
Malay (M) 1477 0.053 0.532 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.005
M, 11 or 12 yrs of schooling 296 0.032 0.571 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.354
M, 11/12y.s., age 25-35, pot.exp.10-20yrs 56 0.078 0.480 0.050 0.106 1.000 1.000
Martins (2001) - full sample 2338 0.033 0.340 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004
yrs of schooling < 12 1999 -0.013 0.143 0.020 0.041 0.003 0.004
yrs of sch. < 12, pot. exp. 20-30 yrs 732 -0.002 0.306 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002
yrs of sch. < 12, pot. exp. 20/21 yrs 165 -0.002 0.359 0.017 0.043 0.007 0.012
Chang (2011) - 1985 sample 1627 -0.049 0.247 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.004
white (W) 1282 -0.067 0.185 0.011 0.015 0.003 0.004
W, 12 yrs of schooling 609 -0.058 0.278 0.004 0.009 0.020 0.035
W, 12 yrs of s., age 30-35, recent job 89 -0.116 0.450 0.027 0.056 0.008 0.022
Wooldridge - full sample of mothers 31857 0.034 0.134 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.031
hispanic (H) 18897 0.021 0.064 0.059 0.110 0.019 0.042
H, < 10 yrs of schooling 7085 -0.003 0.192 0.001 0.001 0.024 0.082
H, 12 yrs of schooling, age 25 341 -0.067 0.245 0.061 0.124 0.027 0.069
Note: Tests are based on 1999 bootstrap draws.
We rst consider the data of Schafgans (1998) which come from the Second Malaysian Family
Life Survey (MFLS-2) conducted between August 1988 and January 1989 in Peninsular Malaysia.
The author investigates the wage gap between ethnic Chinese and Malays for both males and
females. Here, we only use the female subsample with non-missing information on unearned
income, which encounters 2,770 observations. The selection variable S equals 1 if an individual
is a wage worker and 0 otherwise. The category of non-wage workers therefore also includes
self-employed and individuals engaged in home production. The outcome variable Y is the log of
the hourly wage rate, which is only observed conditional on S = 1. In contrast, the covariates X
are observed for the entire sample and comprise potential experience, education, and a dummy
20for living in an urban area. The instrument Z to be tested is unearned income, i.e., income
not coming from paid work. We dichotomize this variable such that it is equal to one whenever
unearned income is larger than zero, which is the case for 1,430 observations.
The tests suggest that IV validity is violated in the entire sample, as all p-values are smaller
than 1%. Also the rather large standardized dierence of 0.658 indicates that the point estimate
of the mean outcome of the always selected is well outside its bounds. When conditioning on
Malay ethnicity all tests remain signicant at the 1% level. Considering the subsample with
Malay ethnicity and a level of schooling equivalent to high school graduation, three out of four
tests reject the null at the 5% level. The only exception is the probability-based test with full
recentering (which is, however, less attractive than that with partial recentering as already
mentioned in Section 3). Finally, we additionally restrict the sample to include only individuals
in the age bracket 25-35 with 10-20 years of potential experience. The partially recentered
mean test still rejects IV validity at the 5% level despite using just 56 observations, while the
fully recentered method is just border line signicant. However, the sample appears to be too
small for the probability-based tests to work properly and give meaningful results. Both yield
a p-value of 100%. As a further worrisome matter in addition to the test results, note that
compliance remains always positive even when conditioning on observed characteristics, while in
the remaining three applications, conditional `compliance' is negative (which is more in line with
the empirical literature). This points to the violation of the monotonicity assumption, because
the former is consistent with the nonexistence of deers and the latter with the nonexistence of
compliers.
Our second application is based on the Portuguese female labor market data of Martins (2001),
who compared parametric and semiparametric estimators of sample selection models. The sample
stems from the 1991 wave of the Portuguese Employment Survey and consists of 2,339 married
women aged below 60 whose husbands earned labor income. The outcome variable is log hourly
wage, which is only observed for those 1,400 women who participate in the labor market (such that
S = 1). The covariates X include years of education and potential experience. The instrumental
21variable Z is the log of husband's wage, which we use to create a binary variable indicating whether
husband's wage is higher than the median (11.085). Applying our tests to the full sample (i.e.,
testing for unconditional IV validity) shows that the null is rejected at any conventional level of
signicance. Restricting the data to individuals with a low level of education (less than 12 years)
still entails rejections at the 5% or an even lower level of signicance. Conditioning on particular
brackets of potential education on top of the previous restrictions does not change the picture:
Husband's income appears to be an invalid instrument given the covariates available in Martins
(2001).
Chang (2011) proposes a simulation estimator for two-tiered dynamic panel tobit models
which is applied to a 9-year panel data set from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
The sample contains observations for 1,627 married women between 1984 and 1992 who are aged
between 19 and 60 in 1985. Here, we focus on the 1985 wave. The selection indicator S is equal to
one if the woman provided a positive supply of hours worked in that year. Wife's income in 1985
serves as outcome variable Y . The instrument Z is husband's income 1985, the median of which
is 25,228. Furthermore, the data contain information on education, age, race, and the recent
employment history as conditioning set X. All test statistics are signicant at the 1% level when
applied to the entire sample and to the white subsample. The p-values of any test remain below
5% when also conditioning on (i) white ethnicity, (ii) white ethnicity and years of schooling and
(iii) white ethnicity, years of schooling, the age bracket 30 to 35, and recent employment. Our
results therefore suggest that IV validity is unlikely to hold in this data set.
The fourth application we consider is the instructional \LABSUP" data set on married
mothers in the US provided by J. Wooldridge on his website with textbook data sets
(http://fmwww.bc.edu/ec-p/data/wooldridge/datasets.list.html). For a sample of Blacks and
Hispanics, it contains similar information as the U.S. Census Public Use Micro Samples used
by Angrist and Evans (1998) to estimate the eect of fertility on female labor supply. With
31,857 observations, it is substantially larger than the samples investigated so far. The outcome
variable is mother's labor income per year in 1000 USD, which is only observed for the 18,789
22individuals providing positive labor supply (S = 1). The covariates X include ethnicity, years of
schooling, and age. The instrument Z is non-wife income per year in 1000, the median of which
is 29.399. Applied to the entire data, the tests again suggest hat IV validity does not hold. In
the subsample of Hispanics, the probability-based tests reject the null at the 5% level while
the partially recentered mean test does so at the 10% level. When also conditioning on poor
education, only the fully recentered probability-based test yields a p-value larger than 5%, but
the test statistic is still signicant at the 10% level. Finally, we restrict the sample to 25 years
old Hispanics with high school education. Three out of four tests reject the null at the 10% and
one at the 5% level. Again, the results cast serious doubts on the validity of the instrument.
We now turn to our second instrumental variable to be investigated, (young) children in
the household. We rst reconsider the data of Martins (2001), who also uses kids under 3
as instrument. This time, however, none of our tests indicate that the exclusion restriction
and/or monotonicity are violated. When examining IV validity in the entire sample and in the
same subsamples as before, the p-values are quite large. Also the standardized distance remains
negative throughout, implying that none of the constraints are binding.
Table 5: Applications - young kids
mean constraints prob. constraints
Study n % comp. st.dist p-val(p) p-val(f) p-val(p) p-val(f)
Martins (2001) - full sample 2338 0.058 -0.097 0.467 0.984 0.796 0.963
yrs of schooling < 12 1999 0.037 -0.051 0.572 0.957 0.314 0.481
yrs of s. < 12, pot. exp. 20-30 yrs 732 -0.113 -0.247 0.742 0.999 0.805 0.961
yrs of s. < 12, pot. exp. 20/21 yrs 165 -0.199 -0.382 0.881 0.997 0.524 0.714
MR (2008) - 1995-1999 married females 53966 -0.151 -0.351 1.000 1.000 0.519 0.989
high school graduate (hsg) 18383 -0.130 -0.289 1.000 1.000 0.531 1.000
hsg, pot. exp. 20-30 yrs 7889 -0.107 -0.159 0.531 1.000 0.179 0.584
hsg, pot. exp. 20 yrs, south 239 -0.017 -0.021 0.466 0.559 0.698 0.759
Lee (2009) - female sample 4044 -0.046 -0.024 0.520 0.929 0.598 0.952
married, black (B) 2021 -0.050 0.002 0.477 0.793 0.311 0.715
mar., B, yrs of s. < 12 1475 -0.058 -0.163 0.532 0.999 0.848 0.997
mar., B, yrs of s. < 12, no recent job 699 -0.030 -0.294 0.669 0.987 0.683 0.883
Chang (2011) - 1985 sample 1627 -0.110 0.016 0.456 0.740 0.903 1.000
white (W) 1282 -0.134 0.043 0.243 0.456 0.907 1.000
W, 12 yrs of schooling 609 -0.126 0.040 0.387 0.657 0.900 0.999
W, 12 yrs of s., age 30-35, recent job 89 -0.034 0.219 0.166 0.320 0.571 0.722
Note: Tests are based on 1999 bootstrap draws.
Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) investigate two repeated cross sections (1975-1979) and (1995-
231999) of the US Current Population Survey (CPS) to determine the selection of females into the
full-time work force over time using Heckman two-step estimation. Individuals are classied
as working (S = 1) if they work 35+ hours per week and at least 50 weeks during the year.
Self-employed and persons in the military, agriculture, or private household sectors as well as
individuals with inconsistent reports on earnings or with allocated earnings are excluded from the
sample with observed wages, see Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) for further details. The outcome
variable is log hourly wage, which is computed based on total annual earnings deated by the
US Consumer Price Index. Here, we focus on the subsample of married white females between
the ages of 25 and 54 in the second repeated cross section, in total 53,966 observations. The
instrument Z to be tested is the incidence of children aged 0-6 in the household. The covariates
X include education, potential work experience, the marital status, and regional dummies. As
before, instrument validity is not rejected by any test in the entire sample. This result does not
change when restricting the data to observations with (i) high school graduation, (ii) high school
graduation and potential experience of 20 to 30 years, and (iii) high school graduation, 20 years
of potential experience and living in the Southern states.
Next, we consider data from a labor market policy experiment which was conducted in the
U.S. in the mid-1990s in order to assess the publicly funded Job Corps program. This program
targets young individuals (aged 16-24 years) that have a legal residence in the U.S. and come
from a low-income household, see Schochet, Burghardt, and Glazerman (2001) for further details.
It provides participants with approximately 1,100 hours of vocational training and education as
well as with housing, board, and health services over an average duration of roughly 8 months.
Here, we use the female subsample of the experimental data as also analyzed by Lee (2009),
which includes 4,044 observations. The selection indicator S states if someone is working one
year after program start which is the case for 1,454 individuals. The outcome Y is the hourly
wage. The baseline survey prior to the program contains (among other factors) information on
the marital status, ethnicity, education, and recent labor market history which serve as covariates
X. The instrument Z is the incidence of children in the household. We do not nd violations of
24the IV assumptions, neither in the entire sample, nor in subsamples dened upon marital status,
ethnicity, low education, and recent unemployment.
In our last application, we return to Chang (2011), who uses the number young children as
instrument. Our binary Z indicates whether at least one child under 6 is present in the household.
Relying on the same sample restrictions as before, all p-values are considerably larger than 10%.
However, the standardized dierences are positive throughout, indicating that one constraint is
binding (albeit insignicantly so).
We conclude that the tests do not provide evidence against the IV validity of young children.
In contrast, our results evoke serious concerns over the appropriateness of non-wife/husband's
income, or similar variables. This is bad news for the literature on female wage equations,
because in general, at least one element in Z needs to be continuous when using exible (semi-
or non-parametric) sample selection models. With this respect, non-wife income appeared to be
much more suitable than the number of children, which typically consists of very few mass points.
However, our tests suggest that it is an invalid instrument, at least conditional on the covariates
commonly used in applications.
6 Conclusion
This paper has proposed a new test for instrumental validity in sample selection models. The
latter commonly invoke two restrictions: (i) the instrument does not directly aect the outcome
and (ii) the unobserved term in the selection equation is additively separable. We have shown
that these assumptions allow us to both bound and point identify the distribution of the always
selected, i.e., the subpopulation that is selected irrespective of the instrument. As the point
must lie within the bounds, this provides us with two testable inequality constraints. Using
tests based on a sequential bootstrap method proposed by Bennett (2009), we have considered
eight empirical applications to verify the validity of two instruments that are often used in the
estimation of female wages under sample selection: non-wife income and the number of young
25children. Our results provide evidence that non-wife income is not a valid instrument, at least
conditional on the covariates commonly available in such studies. However, the tests do not refute
the IV validity of the number of children.
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